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ADDITIONAL ISSUES 0N APPEAL
Respondent entitled t0 attorney’s fees 0n appeal based 0n Idaho Code § 12-121
because Sean has appealed errors that he invited as well as asked this Court to
second guess the Trial Court’s factual determination that Lindsey did not intend t0
give Sean anything when she put him on the deed?
Is

ARGUMENT
I.

was not an error

Sean had n0 interest in the
propertv With the partition statutes because at the beginning 0f the litigation, he
presumptivelv held an interest. Even if it was error, it was error invited bv Sean
and should not be considered 0n appeal.
It

The

thrust 0f Sean’s

for the Trial

argument

not have an interest in the home,

it

is

Court

t0 determine

that since the

was improper

partition statutes to reach that determination.

Court determined after

trial that

for the Trial Court t0 proceed

The primary

error in this

Sean did

under the

argument

is

that

Sean not

only consented t0 the manner in Which the Trial Court proceeded, but actually stipulated t0
cannot be heard to complain about
utilize the partition statutes t0

it

now.

On the merits,

it

was proper

it

and

for the Trial Court t0

determine the interest of Sean and Lindsey because Sean was on

the deed.

A.

proceed under the partition statutes knowing full well that the
result 0f the trial could be that he had no interest in the propertv.

Sean agreed

t0

A partition action contemplates the Court will determine the percentage interests of the
parties in the property. Idaho

may

Code

§

6-509 pertaining t0

partial partition states, “. .the
.

ﬁrst ascertain and determine the shares or interests respectively held

cotenants.” Idaho

Code Ann.

§ 6-509.

by

Court

the original

Thereafter, the Court uses those interests to determine an

how much

equitable partition of the property and t0 determine

0f the costs 0f the partition are t0

be paid by each party. “The costs 0f partition, including reasonable counsel
the Plaintiff or either of the Defendants for the

common beneﬁt,

fees,

fees of referees,

expended by
and other

disbursements, must be paid by the parties respectively entitled to share in the lands divided, i3

proportion t0 their respective interests therein,.
however, provides no guidance on

how to

silent in that regard, as is the case here.

.”
.

Idaho Code Ann.

§ 6-545.

determine each co-tenants’ share

Idaho case law,

when the deed

is

Authority from other jurisdictions hold that if the deed

is silent

as t0 percentage

ownership, then a presumption arises that the co-tenants intended t0 have equal ownership
interests.

price

This presumption can be rebutted by showing an unequal contribution to the purchase

by one of the

co-tenants.

It is

not the same as an accounting between two co-tenants,

the determination of the shares 0f each based

on Who contributed

it is

t0 the purchase price at the

time of acquisition.

Where, as here, the character 0f ownership is that of co-tenancy,
and the instrument by which the property was acquired is silent as
t0 the respective interests 0f the co—owners, it is presumed that they
share equally. However, When in rebuttal it is shown that they
contributed unequally t0 the purchase price, a presumption arises
that they intended t0 share the property proportionately t0 the
purchase price.

Cummings

v.

Anderson, 94 Wash. 2d

135, 140, 614 P.2d 1283, 1287

(1980) citing Iredell

V. Iredell,

Wash.2d 627, 305 P.2d 805

49

(1957).

Annot., Presumption and proof as t0
shares of respective grantees or

conveyance or transfer
two or more persons as tenants in

transferees in
to

common,

silent in that regard,

156

A.L.R. 515 (1945).
This law from the State of Washington

is

What the

Trial Court adopted pursuant to the

stipulation of the parties.

“Idaho law

is

well established that one

consented t0 0r acquiesced

in.

947 (2018)
citations

citing

error.”

Davison

Thomson

v.

successfully complain 0f errors one has

In other words, invited errors are not reversible.

invited error applies t0 estop a party

commission 0f the

may not

v.

from asserting an error When

his

own

The doctrine of

conduct induces the

Debest Plumbing, Ina, 163 Idaho 571, 575, 416 P.3d 943,

Olsen, 147 Idaho 99, 106, 205 P.3d 1235, 1242 (2009) (internal

and quotations omitted).

Sean stipulated

that

he presumptively owned

deed, and that the presumption could be rebutted

50%

0f the property because he was 0n the

by proof of Who paid

the purchase price. Sean

admitted in his answer that Lindsey paid the entire purchase price and admitted that same thing
prior to the

commencement 0f the

trial.

MR. BISTLINE: Your Honor,
What

Ithink we're in agreement, because

I heard was, we'll adopt the out-of-state

50/50, we'll 100k at

Who

presumption of

contributed t0 the purchase price, which

I

we can stipulate t0 that, they admit she paid the Whole thing,
and so really we're left With this issue 0f the gift. So I think in light
of us agreeing 0n the procedure, I think it makes even more sense

think

t0

now

get to the

THE COURT:

gift.

This

is

the law that

we Will

follow, then,

What the

have discussed, we will assume that there is a presumption
Where we have two people 0n a deed that they are co—tenants
owning undivided 50 percent interest, that that presumption is

parties
that

rebuttable, that
I

we

don't think there's

Will look at a contribution.

any dispute

that

Miss Bordwell contributed 100

percent 0f the purchase price 0f the property; correct?

MR. FRANTZ:

That

correct,

is

Your Honor.
(Tr. 93, L.

With

the

knowledge

that the result

owner 0f the property, Sean agreed

t0

of the

trial

19

1

it

94, L. 11)1

could be that Lindsey remained the

go forward With the action as a

error for the Trial Court t0 proceed under the partition statutes,

Court should not consider

—

it

100%

partition action. If it

was an

was

invited error and this

on appeal.

A11 references to the transcript are to the combined transcript provided by the Clerk of the Court entitled

“Transcript Record” and the page numbers related to the Bates Stamped page numbers 0n the lower right corner 0f

each page of said document.

B.

It

was not an error

beginning of this

proceed under the partition statutes because at the
litigation, Sean presumptively held some interest because he
t0

was on the deed.
Sean argues that

0n a statutory scheme

the, “...District

Court cannot base

Sean have an

that requires

its

decision that Sean has no interest

interest. (Appellant’s

Opening Brief at p.19).

Sean also argues that since the Trial Court already determined on summary judgment that the
statute

of limitations had run 0n any quiet

in the partition action

fails

because Sean did have an interest in

was eliminated
The

Zeyen

v.

claim, then the Court could not effectively quiet

by ﬁnding Sean had no

title

interest

title

this

interest in the property.

property

When this

This argument

litigation started,

and his

after trial.

interpretation 0f a statute

Pocatello/Chubbuck Sch.

is

Dist.

a question 0f law Which this Court reviews de novo.

N0. 25, 451 P.3d 25, 29 (Idaho 2019).

Idaho law presumes the holder 0f title t0 property
this

(Id).

is

the legal

owner 0f that property and

presumption can only be overcome by meeting the elements of certain recognized

exceptions.

Luce

v.

Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 270, 127 P.3d 167, 173 (2005) (citing Hettinga

Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467, 469, 886 P.2d 772, 774 (1994); Russ Ballard

v.

v.

Lava Hot Springs

Resort, Ina, 97 Idaho 572, 579, 548 P.2d 72, 79 (1976)).

Sean was on the deed
interest in the property, but

owner 0f the property and

at the

what

beginning of this

interest

was not

the partition statutes

litigation, so

he presumptively held an

set forth in the deed.

were the only way

Sean was therefore a co-

t0 determine

What

his interest

was.

It

was not an

error t0 proceed under the partition statute t0 determine Sean’s interest in

the property even if the ﬁnal determination

was

that

he held n0 interest in the property.

The deed t0 Sean and Lindsev is ambiguous as t0 the ownership interest 0f each
and parole evidence would have been admissible even if Sean had not agreed
that it was admissible.

II.

Sean argues that the Trial Court should not have considered any extrinsic evidence 0f
Lindsey’s intent because the deed in this case was not ambiguous. (Appellant’s Opening Brief at

Sean further argues that “[w]hile intent as

p. 20).

t0

what ownership percentage Sean was

supposed t0 receive was clearly admissible, evidence indicating that Lindsey never intended
give Sean any interest

interest.

The question

Opening Brief at
First,

t0 receive...”

the same.

if,

not.

for trial

p. 25).

It

was simply how much

This too

as argued

was already determined

is

by Sean,

invited error if it

“...intent as t0

What Lindsey
as

intended to give to Sean

whether Lindsey intended

that

interest

is

Lindsey had given Sean an

had she given him.” (Appellant’s

an error

at all.

what ownership percentage Sean was supposed

was admissible, then evidence 0f Lindsey’s

same question

him on

was

to

When

t0 give

intent is admissible.

she put

him any

him 0n

The evidence

the deed

interest in the

is

is

the exact

home When

she put

the deed.

Second,

if n0

Sean would have

evidence would have been admitted pertaining t0 Lindsey’s donative intent,

10st the case at the outset.

As

set forth above,

Sean agreed

that the

Court

should adopt a presumption of 50/50 ownership Which could be rebutted by evidence 0f Who
paid the purchase price and that Lindsey had paid the entire price. Therefore, Lindsey held a

100% ownership
had donative

interest at the

intent

intended to give

beginning 0f the

trial.

If n0 evidence relevant t0

would have been admitted, then Sean could not prove

him

anything.

that

show Lindsey

Lindsey had

Third, Sean speciﬁcally stipulated that the primary issue in the

intent to

make

a gift

when

trial

would be Lindsey’s

she placed Sean on the deed, so he cannot obj ect t0 evidence of her

intent.

Court: So, Mr. Frantz, does

we

suggested, that

it

make

turn the page t0

defendant's contention that there

MR. FRANTZ:

I

suppose

it

sense, as

Mr. Bistline

you to begin with respect to the

was a

gift?

does.
(Tr. 95, L. 3-7).

Lastly, the

t0

how much

intent

0f an

interest, s0

ambiguous

it is

interest t0 Sean,

in that regard

however,

it is

silent as

and parole evidence of the party’s

would have been admissible.
The deed

parole evidence

that

deed does unambiguously grant some

in question is

ambiguous

would have been admissible

such evidence was admissible

III.

as t0 the percentage interest 0f

The question 0f intent

t0 establish that interest

Sean and Lindsey and

even

if

Sean had not agreed

at trial.

is

a question of fact and Sean provided the best evidence

t0 support the Trial Court’s determination that

Lindsev did not intend
Sean anvthing when she placed him on the deed.

Sean argues that
Lindsey did not intend

“...the District

t0 gift

Sean a

Court erred when

50%

it

t0 give

reached the legal conclusion that

interest.” Substantial

evidence supports the Trial

Court’s determination with most 0f it coming from Sean himself. This argument

is

nothing more

than asking this Court to second guess the Trial Court’s factual determination that Lindsey did
not intend t0 give anything to Sean by placing

A.

him the

deed.

Standard 0f Review.
In his standard 0f review,

Sean

tries t0

couch

this issue as

one 0f law. “This Court

exercises free review over the lower court’s conclusions 0f law t0 determine...whether the legal

conclusions are sustained by the facts found.’ Baxter
question 0f intent

is

a factual determination. Idaho

152 Idaho 401, 406, 272 P.3d 373, 378 (201

1).

v.

Craney, 16 P.3d 263, 269 (2000).” The

Dev,

LLC v.

An Appellate

Teton View Golestates, LLC,

Court will not disturb a factual

determination of a Trial Court if substantial though conﬂicting evidence exists to support

Rowley

v.

Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 108, 982 P.2d 940, 943 (1999).

The question of Lindsey’s

intent

when

she placed Sean 0n the deed

and Sean provided the best evidence

to support the Trial Court’s

intend to give Sean an interest in the

home when

B.

it.

she placed

ﬁnding

him 0n

is

that

a question 0f fact

Lindsey did not

the deed.

The

Trial Court found that Lindsey did not understand the effect of placing
Sean on the deed and Sean himself provided all the evidence that neither he
nor Lindsey believed that she was giving him a gift when she placed him on the
de_ed-

Sean’s argument

is

that the only fact that the Trial

determining Lindsey’s intent was the fact that Lindsey
result in

him having an ownership

she must have intended

him

t0

interest in the

Court should have considered in

knew that placing Sean 0n

the deed could

home. Therefore, by placing him 0n the deed,

have an ownership

interest in the

home. “One who intentionally

engages in conduct knowing that particular results are substantially certain to follow also intends
the results.” (Appellant’s

Opening Brief at p.

23). First, the entire surrounding facts

circumstances are t0 be considered in determination a party’s intent, not just one

fact,

and
but more

importantly, the Trial Court speciﬁcally found that Lindsey did not understand the potential

result

of placing Sean on the deed. She could not, therefore, have been substantially certain that

the result 0f putting Sean

0n the deed could be

that

Sean owned half 0f the home.

Under Idaho law, a “gift” is deﬁned t0 mean “a voluntary
0f property by one t0 another without consideration 0r
compensation therefor.”

transfer

T0

donor must deliver property to a donee, 0r t0
someone on his or her behalf, with a manifested intent to make a
gift 0f the property.
effectuate a gift, a

accomplished when the grantor “relinquish[es]
present and future dominion over the property.”
Delivery

all

is

Donative intent

may be proven by

direct evidence, including

statements 0f donative intent, 0r inferences drawn from the

surrounding circumstances, such as the relationship between the

donor and donee.

Banner Life Ins. C0.

v.

Mark

Wallace Dixson Irrevocable
Tn, 147 Idaho 117, 126, 206
P.3d 481, 490 (2009).

At no point did Sean

him

testify that

a gift 0f half interest 0f the home,

Lindsey ever communicated that she intended to make

it

was just assumed.

(Tr.

Lindsey testiﬁed that she asked Sean numerous times
0f her house.
the last time

(Tr. 130, L. 14-18).

it

Sean conﬁrmed

21

if he

1,

L. 3-10).

would

try

this fact, (Tr. 225, L. 3-7),

and “screw her” out
and conﬁrmed

that

occurred was shortly before the closing.

Q. Okay. So, you're

at the title

company

as you're signing these

Did you and Miss Bordwell ever -- did you
ever ask Miss Bordwell if she wanted you t0 be on the deed?

buyer's instructions.

A.

I

conﬁrmed With her

me 0n the house,

and

I

that

it

was

still

okay

that she

was putting

explained to her what that meant, and she

said again, you know, she doesn't believe I was going to do
anything to screw her out 0f the house, and I said again, we're a
loving couple, we're not breaking up any time soon, so it's a nonissue; so, no, I'm not going to screw you out of the house.

(Tr. 215, L.

25—216,

L. 11)

A person who is intending t0 part with all dominion and control over property cannot at
the

same time be concerned about

getting “screwed” out 0f that property at

some

point with which Sean agreed.

Q. Did she ever give you any

gifts

When you guys were

together?

later date, a

A.

Of course.

Q. Did she ever ask you When she gave you those
to screw her out 0f the gifts when you broke up?

A.

I

don't see

how that's

gifts if you

were going

to try

a relevant question.

Q. The question was, did you ever ask her that?

A.

Of course

not. Gifts don't

work that way.
(Tr. 225, L.

Sean further testiﬁed
the

title,

that,

he would have obliged
Q.

You just

20 — 226, L. 4)

but for the statute of limitations, if Lindsay had wanted

her.

you had four years

said

t0

ﬁgure

it

out and she could

my name off -- and you could have taken my name
that time. Would you have consented t0 that?

have taken
during

him

off

A. Iwould not have.
Q.

And why

you just say she could have taken your name off

did

in the four years?

was an issue, we could have
was never something that
discussed it,
we ever talked about. So, if it was something she thought needed
t0 be done, it would have been taken care 0f.
A.

Imay have misworded it.

If there

but after the four years,

it

(Tr. 221, L. 15

Sean further testiﬁed
Lindsey giving him a

gift

— 222,

L. 1)

he never did consider him being on the deed amounted to

that

worth more than $150,000.

BY MR.

BISTLINE: The speciﬁc question is, when you saw
name
0n
the deed, you thought, wow, Ijust was given
your
Q.

$150,000 in value.

MR. FRANTZ:
MR. BISTLINE:

I'm going t0 object.

Is that

a question?

That's the question.

MR. FRANTZ: Are you

asking if that's What he thought?

10

off

MR. BISTLINE:

Yeah.

THE WITNESS:

The only thing

I

we just bought a

said was,

house together.

BY MR. BISTLINE:

Q:

So,

What you

really

—

A. So, I did not post anything about a $150,000 purchase 0r
0n Facebook, no, I did not.
Q. But the question

A. N0,

I

thought

is,

did

you think

gift

that?

we just bought a house

together.

Q. So your understanding was that as per your normal
relationship, you guys were looking at a place to live, you decided

where t0 live together, and you had input, and she values your
input 0n the home, same as she would value your input 0n a rental;
right?

A. Correct.
(Tr. 228, L. 1-23)

Sean did not believe that he was receiving any
possession of the

gift

and only believed he was taking

home with Lindsey.

Q. And What was your understanding 0f What this document was that you were
signing for that homeowner's exemption?

A. With both 0f our names 0n

it,

Iwas assuming

were taking possession of the house

his

name was

As

set forth

at trial that

my understanding was we

together.

(Tr.

Lindsey maintained

--

21

1,

L.

24 — 212, L. 4)

Sean told her that he was not going t0

not on the property and that was

why

she put

him on the

title.

live in a place that

(Tr. 234, L. 6-13).

below, Sean’s reasons for wanting to be on the deed seem t0 have nothing to do with

receiving a gift and

more

t0

d0 with

it

being “his” house so he should be 0n the deed.

11

The
that

sole grounds relied

upon by Sean

to support his

argument

that the Trial

Lindsey knew the legal effect of placing Sean 0n the deed When she did

speciﬁcally found otherwise and that ﬁnding
Plaintiff and

is

so.

Court erred

The

is

Trial Court

supported by the record.

Defendant were not as familiar with

transactions as the plaintiff in Ashe. This

was

real estate

Plaintiff’s ﬁrst

purchase. Despite Plaintiffs parents’ warning, her

trial

home

testimony

showed that she did not understand that placing Defendant’s name
on the deed could result in Defendant’s owning an interest in the
property if she did not intend for him t0 have an ownership
interest. Plaintiff testiﬁed that she asked t0 be placed on the deed
ﬁrst as the owner and for Defendant t0 be placed 0n the deed as an
“authorized user.” Plaintiff” s

trial

testimony indicated that

time 0f the transfer she lacked the intent to

make

at the

a gift 0f an

ownership interest in the property to Defendant. Thus, Defendant
has not established Plaintiff” s intent t0 give an ownership interest

under Ashe. (R. V01
This ﬁnding

Lindsey

listed

Sean

is

1.,

p. 359).

supported by substantial evidence. At closing, the deed t0 Sean and

ﬁrst.

Lindsey directed the

title

company

to

change

this to

put her

name

ﬁrst

based on her misunderstanding 0f the law.
Q.

And do you recall

the day

you went

to close

on

this

home?

A. Yes.
Q.

And from What

to you,

I

and they had

gather, there
his

name

were a Whole bunch 0f documents presented
and your name second.

ﬁrst

A. Yes.
Q. And you then directed somebody
names.

at the title

company to switch those

A. Yes.
Q.

Why did you d0 that?
my understanding, just that the

0n anything is, like, the
main owner. So, I saw that as, you know,
one paying for the house,
so I'm the one paying for the house, my name should be ﬁrst. I thought that
A. In

ﬁrst person that's
he's not the

represented something.
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And you don't have any training
None

in

law or anything

like that?

whatsoever.

And the

title

company

didn't bother t0

—

?@PQPO

N0 one instructed us
And

0n anything.

so were there any other discussions about Sean being on the deed?

No, we

didn't talk about

it.

(Tr. 235, L. 13

As

— 234,

the Trial Court found, Lindsey did not understand

how

L. 11)

deeds workz and Sean

apparently did not either because, as stated above, he did not believe that Lindsey had transferred

a $150,000 asset to him. Furthermore, his reason for wanting to be on the deed had nothing to do

with the actual ownership 0f the property.
Q. BY MR. BISTLINE: At some point in this thing, you said, if I
was not going to be 0n the deed, you would not have proceeded.
What did you mean by that statement?

A.

We probably wouldn't have proceeded t0 build a house. We

probably would have bought something that was preexisting.
Q. So, I'm not seeing the connection t0 you being 0n the deed or
not being on the deed versus a house that is either done or not
done. What's the connection?

A. That's

my answer.

I

don't

have a way of explaining that

t0 you.

If we weren't

going to buy the house together 0r build a house
together, then there was no reason to continue on that.
Q. So you're saying that if you hadn't had any input on the ﬂoor
plan 0f the house 0r anything, then you wouldn't have cared if you

were 0n the deed?

2

worth mentioning that the title company’s unauthorized practice 0f law cost these litigants thousands 0f dollars
had been told to reverse the names on a deed, the attorney would want to know Why and
none of this would have happened.
It is

in legal fees. If an attorney
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A.

We would have probably gone and found an apartment or

something else, or maybe done a rental property, and then she
would have ended up investing her money, like she was intending
to

d0 in the ﬁrst place.
(Tr. 224, L. 1-23)

The

fact that

Lindsey put Sean on the deed knowing

it

evidence of her intent to give him in excess 0f $ 1 50,000 and

overcome
intend t0

that

all

make Sean

a

interest in the

gift.

when
IV.

scant

nowhere near sufﬁcient

to

Furthermore, Lindsey’s acknowledgment in the “cheating contract”

is

not competent evidence that Lindsey intended to give

home. Sean was just making sure Lindsey would not kick him out 0f the

home, Which implies he understood she had the

The

is

is

the other evidence supporting the Trial Court’s conclusion that Lindsey did not

Sean had some claim t0 the home

Sean an

might be a bad idea

Trial Court’s determination that

she placed

ability t0

do

that

because

Lindsey did not intend

was her home.

it

t0 give

any

interest t0

Sean

him 0n the deed should be upheld.

Lindsev is entitled t0 an award 0f her attornev’s fees incurred 0n appeal because
Sean has appealed errors he invited and has improperlv asked this Court t0 second
guess the Trial Court’s factual determination that Lindsev did not intend t0 give

Sean anything.

An award 0f attorney’s

fees

0n appeal pursuant

t0

Idaho Code

§

12-121

is

proper

appears that the appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably or Without foundation.
Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006).

“An award of attorney

fees

if it

Hogg v.
is

appropriate if the appellant simply invites the appellate court to second-guess the Trial Court 0n

conﬂicting evidence.”

At

trial,

result could

Id.

Sean stipulated

to

proceed under the partition statutes knowing

be that Sean was determined to have no

Court to declare that

it

was

stipulated. Furthermore,

interest in the property.

full

Sean

error for the Trial Court to utilize the very process to

Sean has done nothing more than ask
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this

well the

now

asks this

which he

Court to overturn a mountain

0f evidence supporting the Trial Court’s conclusion that Lindsey did not intend t0 give Sean an
interest in the

home.

Lindsey

is

entitled t0

an award 0f her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in

defending this appeal.

DATED this 27th day ofNovember, 2019.

ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Ihereby
the following

certify that

on the

27th

of November, 2019,

I

served a true and correct copy of

RESPONDENT’S REPLY BRIEF by the method indicated below,

and addressed

t0 the following:

Jonathon Frantz
Post Falls

Law

806 E. Polston Ave., Ste.
Post Falls, ID 83854

B

D
D
D
X

U.S. Mail

Certiﬁed Mail
Facsimile: (208)262-3894
iCourt: service@P0stFallsLaW.com

/s/

NICHOLE FOREMAN
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